# Gemini CLI for the enterprise

This document outlines configuration patterns and best practices for deploying
and managing Gemini CLI in an enterprise environment. By leveraging system-level
settings, administrators can enforce security policies, manage tool access, and
ensure a consistent experience for all users.

> **A note on security:** The patterns described in this document are intended
> to help administrators create a more controlled and secure environment for
> using Gemini CLI. However, they should not be considered a foolproof security
> boundary. A determined user with sufficient privileges on their local machine
> may still be able to circumvent these configurations. These measures are
> designed to prevent accidental misuse and enforce corporate policy in a
> managed environment, not to defend against a malicious actor with local
> administrative rights.

## Centralized configuration: The system settings file

The most powerful tools for enterprise administration are the system-wide
settings files. These files allow you to define a baseline configuration
(`system-defaults.json`) and a set of overrides (`settings.json`) that apply to
all users on a machine. For a complete overview of configuration options, see
the [Configuration documentation](../reference/configuration.md).

Settings are merged from four files. The precedence order for single-value
settings (like `theme`) is:

1. System Defaults (`system-defaults.json`)
2. User Settings (`~/.gemini/settings.json`)
3. Workspace Settings (`<project>/.gemini/settings.json`)
4. System Overrides (`settings.json`)

This means the System Overrides file has the final say. For settings that are
arrays (`includeDirectories`) or objects (`mcpServers`), the values are merged.

**Example of merging and precedence:**

Here is how settings from different levels are combined.

- **System defaults `system-defaults.json`:**

  ```json
  {
    "ui": {
      "theme": "default-corporate-theme"
    },
    "context": {
      "includeDirectories": ["/etc/gemini-cli/common-context"]
    }
  }
  ```

- **User `settings.json` (`~/.gemini/settings.json`):**

  ```json
  {
    "ui": {
      "theme": "user-preferred-dark-theme"
    },
    "mcpServers": {
      "corp-server": {
        "command": "/usr/local/bin/corp-server-dev"
      },
      "user-tool": {
        "command": "npm start --prefix ~/tools/my-tool"
      }
    },
    "context": {
      "includeDirectories": ["~/gemini-context"]
    }
  }
  ```

- **Workspace `settings.json` (`<project>/.gemini/settings.json`):**

  ```json
  {
    "ui": {
      "theme": "project-specific-light-theme"
    },
    "mcpServers": {
      "project-tool": {
        "command": "npm start"
      }
    },
    "context": {
      "includeDirectories": ["./project-context"]
    }
  }
  ```

- **System overrides `settings.json`:**
  ```json
  {
    "ui": {
      "theme": "system-enforced-theme"
    },
    "mcpServers": {
      "corp-server": {
        "command": "/usr/local/bin/corp-server-prod"
      }
    },
    "context": {
      "includeDirectories": ["/etc/gemini-cli/global-context"]
    }
  }
  ```

This results in the following merged configuration:

- **Final merged configuration:**
  ```json
  {
    "ui": {
      "theme": "system-enforced-theme"
    },
    "mcpServers": {
      "corp-server": {
        "command": "/usr/local/bin/corp-server-prod"
      },
      "user-tool": {
        "command": "npm start --prefix ~/tools/my-tool"
      },
      "project-tool": {
        "command": "npm start"
      }
    },
    "context": {
      "includeDirectories": [
        "/etc/gemini-cli/common-context",
        "~/gemini-context",
        "./project-context",
        "/etc/gemini-cli/global-context"
      ]
    }
  }
  ```

**Why:**

- **`theme`**: The value from the system overrides (`system-enforced-theme`) is
  used, as it has the highest precedence.
- **`mcpServers`**: The objects are merged. The `corp-server` definition from
  the system overrides takes precedence over the user's definition. The unique
  `user-tool` and `project-tool` are included.
- **`includeDirectories`**: The arrays are concatenated in the order of System
  Defaults, User, Workspace, and then System Overrides.

- **Location**:
  - **Linux**: `/etc/gemini-cli/settings.json`
  - **Windows**: `C:\ProgramData\gemini-cli\settings.json`
  - **macOS**: `/Library/Application Support/GeminiCli/settings.json`
  - The path can be overridden using the `GEMINI_CLI_SYSTEM_SETTINGS_PATH`
    environment variable.
- **Control**: This file should be managed by system administrators and
  protected with appropriate file permissions to prevent unauthorized
  modification by users.

By using the system settings file, you can enforce the security and
configuration patterns described below.

### Enforcing system settings with a wrapper script

While the `GEMINI_CLI_SYSTEM_SETTINGS_PATH` environment variable provides
flexibility, a user could potentially override it to point to a different
settings file, bypassing the centrally managed configuration. To mitigate this,
enterprises can deploy a wrapper script or alias that ensures the environment
variable is always set to the corporate-controlled path.

This approach ensures that no matter how the user calls the `gemini` command,
the enterprise settings are always loaded with the highest precedence.

**Example wrapper script:**

Administrators can create a script named `gemini` and place it in a directory
that appears earlier in the user's `PATH` than the actual Gemini CLI binary
(e.g., `/usr/local/bin/gemini`).

```bash
#!/bin/bash

# Enforce the path to the corporate system settings file.
# This ensures that the company's configuration is always applied.
export GEMINI_CLI_SYSTEM_SETTINGS_PATH="/etc/gemini-cli/settings.json"

# Find the original gemini executable.
# This is a simple example; a more robust solution might be needed
# depending on the installation method.
REAL_GEMINI_PATH=$(type -aP gemini | grep -v "^$(type -P gemini)$" | head -n 1)

if [ -z "$REAL_GEMINI_PATH" ]; then
  echo "Error: The original 'gemini' executable was not found." >&2
  exit 1
fi

# Pass all arguments to the real Gemini CLI executable.
exec "$REAL_GEMINI_PATH" "$@"
```

By deploying this script, the `GEMINI_CLI_SYSTEM_SETTINGS_PATH` is set within
the script's environment, and the `exec` command replaces the script process
with the actual Gemini CLI process, which inherits the environment variable.
This makes it significantly more difficult for a user to bypass the enforced
settings.

**PowerShell Profile (Windows alternative):**

On Windows, administrators can achieve similar results by adding the environment
variable to the system-wide or user-specific PowerShell profile:

```powershell
Add-Content -Path $PROFILE -Value '$env:GEMINI_CLI_SYSTEM_SETTINGS_PATH="C:\ProgramData\gemini-cli\settings.json"'
```

## User isolation in shared environments

In shared compute environments (like ML experiment runners or shared build
servers), you can isolate Gemini CLI state by overriding the user's home
directory.

By default, Gemini CLI stores configuration and history in `~/.gemini`. You can
use the `GEMINI_CLI_HOME` environment variable to point to a unique directory
for a specific user or job. The CLI will create a `.gemini` folder inside the
specified path.

**macOS/Linux**

```bash
# Isolate state for a specific job
export GEMINI_CLI_HOME="/tmp/gemini-job-123"
gemini
```

**Windows (PowerShell)**

```powershell
# Isolate state for a specific job
$env:GEMINI_CLI_HOME="C:\temp\gemini-job-123"
gemini
```

## Restricting tool access

You can significantly enhance security by controlling which tools the Gemini
model can use. This is achieved through the `tools.core` setting and the
[Policy Engine](../reference/policy-engine.md). For a list of available tools,
see the [Tools reference](../reference/tools.md).

### Allowlisting with `coreTools`

The most secure approach is to explicitly add the tools and commands that users
are permitted to execute to an allowlist. This prevents the use of any tool not
on the approved list.

**Example:** Allow only safe, read-only file operations and listing files.

```json
{
  "tools": {
    "core": ["ReadFileTool", "GlobTool", "ShellTool(ls)"]
  }
}
```

### Blocklisting with `excludeTools` (Deprecated)

> **Deprecated:** Use the [Policy Engine](../reference/policy-engine.md) for
> more robust control.

Alternatively, you can add specific tools that are considered dangerous in your
environment to a blocklist.

**Example:** Prevent the use of the shell tool for removing files.

```json
{
  "tools": {
    "exclude": ["ShellTool(rm -rf)"]
  }
}
```

**Security note:** Blocklisting with `excludeTools` is less secure than
allowlisting with `coreTools`, as it relies on blocking known-bad commands, and
clever users may find ways to bypass simple string-based blocks. **Allowlisting
is the recommended approach.**

### Disabling YOLO mode

To ensure that users cannot bypass the confirmation prompt for tool execution,
you can disable YOLO mode at the policy level. This adds a critical layer of
safety, as it prevents the model from executing tools without explicit user
approval.

**Example:** Force all tool executions to require user confirmation.

```json
{
  "security": {
    "disableYoloMode": true
  }
}
```

This setting is highly recommended in an enterprise environment to prevent
unintended tool execution.

## Managing custom tools (MCP servers)

If your organization uses custom tools via
[Model-Context Protocol (MCP) servers](../tools/mcp-server.md), it is crucial to
understand how server configurations are managed to apply security policies
effectively.

### How MCP server configurations are merged

Gemini CLI loads `settings.json` files from three levels: System, Workspace, and
User. When it comes to the `mcpServers` object, these configurations are
**merged**:

1.  **Merging:** The lists of servers from all three levels are combined into a
    single list.
2.  **Precedence:** If a server with the **same name** is defined at multiple
    levels (e.g., a server named `corp-api` exists in both system and user
    settings), the definition from the highest-precedence level is used. The
    order of precedence is: **System > Workspace > User**.

This means a user **cannot** override the definition of a server that is already
defined in the system-level settings. However, they **can** add new servers with
unique names.

### Enforcing a catalog of tools

The security of your MCP tool ecosystem depends on a combination of defining the
canonical servers and adding their names to an allowlist.

### Restricting tools within an MCP server

For even greater security, especially when dealing with third-party MCP servers,
you can restrict which specific tools from a server are exposed to the model.
This is done using the `includeTools` and `excludeTools` properties within a
server's definition. This allows you to use a subset of tools from a server
without allowing potentially dangerous ones.

Following the principle of least privilege, it is highly recommended to use
`includeTools` to create an allowlist of only the necessary tools.

**Example:** Only allow the `code-search` and `get-ticket-details` tools from a
third-party MCP server, even if the server offers other tools like
`delete-ticket`.

```json
{
  "mcp": {
    "allowed": ["third-party-analyzer"]
  },
  "mcpServers": {
    "third-party-analyzer": {
      "command": "/usr/local/bin/start-3p-analyzer.sh",
      "includeTools": ["code-search", "get-ticket-details"]
    }
  }
}
```

#### More secure pattern: Define and add to allowlist in system settings

To create a secure, centrally-managed catalog of tools, the system administrator
**must** do both of the following in the system-level `settings.json` file:

1.  **Define the full configuration** for every approved server in the
    `mcpServers` object. This ensures that even if a user defines a server with
    the same name, the secure system-level definition will take precedence.
2.  **Add the names** of those servers to an allowlist using the `mcp.allowed`
    setting. This is a critical security step that prevents users from running
    any servers that are not on this list. If this setting is omitted, the CLI
    will merge and allow any server defined by the user.

**Example system `settings.json`:**

1. Add the _names_ of all approved servers to an allowlist. This will prevent
   users from adding their own servers.

2. Provide the canonical _definition_ for each server on the allowlist.

```json
{
  "mcp": {
    "allowed": ["corp-data-api", "source-code-analyzer"]
  },
  "mcpServers": {
    "corp-data-api": {
      "command": "/usr/local/bin/start-corp-api.sh",
      "timeout": 5000
    },
    "source-code-analyzer": {
      "command": "/usr/local/bin/start-analyzer.sh"
    }
  }
}
```

This pattern is more secure because it uses both definition and an allowlist.
Any server a user defines will either be overridden by the system definition (if
it has the same name) or blocked because its name is not in the `mcp.allowed`
list.

### Less secure pattern: Omitting the allowlist

If the administrator defines the `mcpServers` object but fails to also specify
the `mcp.allowed` allowlist, users may add their own servers.

**Example system `settings.json`:**

This configuration defines servers but does not enforce the allowlist. The
administrator has NOT included the "mcp.allowed" setting.

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "corp-data-api": {
      "command": "/usr/local/bin/start-corp-api.sh"
    }
  }
}
```

In this scenario, a user can add their own server in their local
`settings.json`. Because there is no `mcp.allowed` list to filter the merged
results, the user's server will be added to the list of available tools and
allowed to run.

## Enforcing sandboxing for security

To mitigate the risk of potentially harmful operations, you can enforce the use
of sandboxing for all tool execution. The sandbox isolates tool execution in a
containerized environment.

**Example:** Force all tool execution to happen within a Docker sandbox.

```json
{
  "tools": {
    "sandbox": "docker"
  }
}
```

You can also specify a custom, hardened Docker image for the sandbox by building
a custom `sandbox.Dockerfile` as described in the
[Sandboxing documentation](./sandbox.md).

## Controlling network access via proxy

In corporate environments with strict network policies, you can configure Gemini
CLI to route all outbound traffic through a corporate proxy. This can be set via
an environment variable, but it can also be enforced for custom tools via the
`mcpServers` configuration.

**Example (for an MCP server):**

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "proxied-server": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["mcp_server.js"],
      "env": {
        "HTTP_PROXY": "http://proxy.example.com:8080",
        "HTTPS_PROXY": "http://proxy.example.com:8080"
      }
    }
  }
}
```

## Telemetry and auditing

For auditing and monitoring purposes, you can configure Gemini CLI to send
telemetry data to a central location. This allows you to track tool usage and
other events. For more information, see the
[telemetry documentation](./telemetry.md).

**Example:** Enable telemetry and send it to a local OTLP collector. If
`otlpEndpoint` is not specified, it defaults to `http://localhost:4317`.

```json
{
  "telemetry": {
    "enabled": true,
    "target": "gcp",
    "logPrompts": false
  }
}
```

**Note:** Ensure that `logPrompts` is set to `false` in an enterprise setting to
avoid collecting potentially sensitive information from user prompts.

## Authentication

You can enforce a specific authentication method for all users by setting the
`enforcedAuthType` in the system-level `settings.json` file. This prevents users
from choosing a different authentication method. See the
[Authentication docs](../get-started/authentication.md) for more details.

**Example:** Enforce the use of Google login for all users.

```json
{
  "enforcedAuthType": "oauth-personal"
}
```

If a user has a different authentication method configured, they will be
prompted to switch to the enforced method. In non-interactive mode, the CLI will
exit with an error if the configured authentication method does not match the
enforced one.

### Restricting logins to corporate domains

For enterprises using Google Workspace, you can enforce that users only
authenticate with their corporate Google accounts. This is a network-level
control that is configured on a proxy server, not within Gemini CLI itself. It
works by intercepting authentication requests to Google and adding a special
HTTP header.

This policy prevents users from logging in with personal Gmail accounts or other
non-corporate Google accounts.

For detailed instructions, see the Google Workspace Admin Help article on
[blocking access to consumer accounts](https://support.google.com/a/answer/1668854?hl=en#zippy=%2Cstep-choose-a-web-proxy-server%2Cstep-configure-the-network-to-block-certain-accounts).

The general steps are as follows:

1.  **Intercept Requests**: Configure your web proxy to intercept all requests
    to `google.com`.
2.  **Add HTTP Header**: For each intercepted request, add the
    `X-GoogApps-Allowed-Domains` HTTP header.
3.  **Specify Domains**: The value of the header should be a comma-separated
    list of your approved Google Workspace domain names.

**Example header:**

```
X-GoogApps-Allowed-Domains: my-corporate-domain.com, secondary-domain.com
```

When this header is present, Google's authentication service will only allow
logins from accounts belonging to the specified domains.

## Putting it all together: example system `settings.json`

Here is an example of a system `settings.json` file that combines several of the
patterns discussed above to create a secure, controlled environment for Gemini
CLI.

```json
{
  "tools": {
    "sandbox": "docker",
    "core": [
      "ReadFileTool",
      "GlobTool",
      "ShellTool(ls)",
      "ShellTool(cat)",
      "ShellTool(grep)"
    ]
  },
  "mcp": {
    "allowed": ["corp-tools"]
  },
  "mcpServers": {
    "corp-tools": {
      "command": "/opt/gemini-tools/start.sh",
      "timeout": 5000
    }
  },
  "telemetry": {
    "enabled": true,
    "target": "gcp",
    "otlpEndpoint": "https://telemetry-prod.example.com:4317",
    "logPrompts": false
  },
  "advanced": {
    "bugCommand": {
      "urlTemplate": "https://servicedesk.example.com/new-ticket?title={title}&details={info}"
    }
  },
  "privacy": {
    "usageStatisticsEnabled": false
  }
}
```

This configuration:

- Forces all tool execution into a Docker sandbox.
- Strictly uses an allowlist for a small set of safe shell commands and file
  tools.
- Defines and allows a single corporate MCP server for custom tools.
- Enables telemetry for auditing, without logging prompt content.
- Redirects the `/bug` command to an internal ticketing system.
- Disables general usage statistics collection.
