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gemini-cli/packages/core/src/sandbox/windows/WindowsSandboxManager.ts
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/**
* @license
* Copyright 2026 Google LLC
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
import fs from 'node:fs';
import path from 'node:path';
import os from 'node:os';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import {
type SandboxManager,
type SandboxRequest,
type SandboxedCommand,
GOVERNANCE_FILES,
type GlobalSandboxOptions,
sanitizePaths,
tryRealpath,
} from '../../services/sandboxManager.js';
import {
sanitizeEnvironment,
getSecureSanitizationConfig,
} from '../../services/environmentSanitization.js';
import { debugLogger } from '../../utils/debugLogger.js';
import { spawnAsync } from '../../utils/shell-utils.js';
import { isNodeError } from '../../utils/errors.js';
const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
const __dirname = path.dirname(__filename);
/**
* A SandboxManager implementation for Windows that uses Restricted Tokens,
* Job Objects, and Low Integrity levels for process isolation.
* Uses a native C# helper to bypass PowerShell restrictions.
*/
export class WindowsSandboxManager implements SandboxManager {
private readonly helperPath: string;
private initialized = false;
private readonly allowedCache = new Set<string>();
private readonly deniedCache = new Set<string>();
constructor(private readonly options: GlobalSandboxOptions) {
this.helperPath = path.resolve(__dirname, 'GeminiSandbox.exe');
}
/**
* Ensures a file or directory exists.
*/
private touch(filePath: string, isDirectory: boolean): void {
try {
// If it exists (even as a broken symlink), do nothing
if (fs.lstatSync(filePath)) return;
} catch {
// Ignore ENOENT
}
if (isDirectory) {
fs.mkdirSync(filePath, { recursive: true });
} else {
const dir = path.dirname(filePath);
if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) {
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
}
fs.closeSync(fs.openSync(filePath, 'a'));
}
}
private async ensureInitialized(): Promise<void> {
if (this.initialized) return;
if (os.platform() !== 'win32') {
this.initialized = true;
return;
}
try {
if (!fs.existsSync(this.helperPath)) {
debugLogger.log(
`WindowsSandboxManager: Helper not found at ${this.helperPath}. Attempting to compile...`,
);
// If the exe doesn't exist, we try to compile it from the .cs file
const sourcePath = this.helperPath.replace(/\.exe$/, '.cs');
if (fs.existsSync(sourcePath)) {
const systemRoot = process.env['SystemRoot'] || 'C:\\Windows';
const cscPaths = [
'csc.exe', // Try in PATH first
path.join(
systemRoot,
'Microsoft.NET',
'Framework64',
'v4.0.30319',
'csc.exe',
),
path.join(
systemRoot,
'Microsoft.NET',
'Framework',
'v4.0.30319',
'csc.exe',
),
// Added newer framework paths
path.join(
systemRoot,
'Microsoft.NET',
'Framework64',
'v4.8',
'csc.exe',
),
path.join(
systemRoot,
'Microsoft.NET',
'Framework',
'v4.8',
'csc.exe',
),
path.join(
systemRoot,
'Microsoft.NET',
'Framework64',
'v3.5',
'csc.exe',
),
];
let compiled = false;
for (const csc of cscPaths) {
try {
debugLogger.log(
`WindowsSandboxManager: Trying to compile using ${csc}...`,
);
// We use spawnAsync but we don't need to capture output
await spawnAsync(csc, ['/out:' + this.helperPath, sourcePath]);
debugLogger.log(
`WindowsSandboxManager: Successfully compiled sandbox helper at ${this.helperPath}`,
);
compiled = true;
break;
} catch (e) {
debugLogger.log(
`WindowsSandboxManager: Failed to compile using ${csc}: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`,
);
}
}
if (!compiled) {
debugLogger.log(
'WindowsSandboxManager: Failed to compile sandbox helper from any known CSC path.',
);
}
} else {
debugLogger.log(
`WindowsSandboxManager: Source file not found at ${sourcePath}. Cannot compile helper.`,
);
}
} else {
debugLogger.log(
`WindowsSandboxManager: Found helper at ${this.helperPath}`,
);
}
} catch (e) {
debugLogger.log(
'WindowsSandboxManager: Failed to initialize sandbox helper:',
e,
);
}
this.initialized = true;
}
/**
* Prepares a command for sandboxed execution on Windows.
*/
async prepareCommand(req: SandboxRequest): Promise<SandboxedCommand> {
await this.ensureInitialized();
const sanitizationConfig = getSecureSanitizationConfig(
req.policy?.sanitizationConfig,
);
const sanitizedEnv = sanitizeEnvironment(req.env, sanitizationConfig);
// 1. Handle filesystem permissions for Low Integrity
// Grant "Low Mandatory Level" write access to the workspace.
await this.grantLowIntegrityAccess(this.options.workspace);
// Grant "Low Mandatory Level" read access to allowedPaths.
const allowedPaths = sanitizePaths(req.policy?.allowedPaths) || [];
for (const allowedPath of allowedPaths) {
await this.grantLowIntegrityAccess(allowedPath);
}
// Denies access to forbiddenPaths for Low Integrity processes.
const forbiddenPaths = sanitizePaths(req.policy?.forbiddenPaths) || [];
for (const forbiddenPath of forbiddenPaths) {
await this.denyLowIntegrityAccess(forbiddenPath);
}
// 2. Protected governance files
// These must exist on the host before running the sandbox to prevent
// the sandboxed process from creating them with Low integrity.
// By being created as Medium integrity, they are write-protected from Low processes.
for (const file of GOVERNANCE_FILES) {
const filePath = path.join(this.options.workspace, file.path);
this.touch(filePath, file.isDirectory);
// We resolve real paths to ensure protection for both the symlink and its target.
try {
const realPath = fs.realpathSync(filePath);
if (realPath !== filePath) {
// If it's a symlink, the target is already implicitly protected
// if it's outside the Low integrity workspace (likely Medium).
// If it's inside, we ensure it's not accidentally Low.
}
} catch {
// Ignore realpath errors
}
}
// 3. Construct the helper command
// GeminiSandbox.exe <network:0|1> <cwd> <command> [args...]
const program = this.helperPath;
// If the command starts with __, it's an internal command for the sandbox helper itself.
const args = [
req.policy?.networkAccess ? '1' : '0',
req.cwd,
req.command,
...req.args,
];
return {
program,
args,
env: sanitizedEnv,
};
}
/**
* Grants "Low Mandatory Level" access to a path using icacls.
*/
private async grantLowIntegrityAccess(targetPath: string): Promise<void> {
if (os.platform() !== 'win32') {
return;
}
const resolvedPath = await tryRealpath(targetPath);
if (this.allowedCache.has(resolvedPath)) {
return;
}
// Never modify integrity levels for system directories
const systemRoot = process.env['SystemRoot'] || 'C:\\Windows';
const programFiles = process.env['ProgramFiles'] || 'C:\\Program Files';
const programFilesX86 =
process.env['ProgramFiles(x86)'] || 'C:\\Program Files (x86)';
if (
resolvedPath.toLowerCase().startsWith(systemRoot.toLowerCase()) ||
resolvedPath.toLowerCase().startsWith(programFiles.toLowerCase()) ||
resolvedPath.toLowerCase().startsWith(programFilesX86.toLowerCase())
) {
return;
}
try {
await spawnAsync('icacls', [resolvedPath, '/setintegritylevel', 'Low']);
this.allowedCache.add(resolvedPath);
} catch (e) {
debugLogger.log(
'WindowsSandboxManager: icacls failed for',
resolvedPath,
e,
);
}
}
/**
* Explicitly denies access to a path for Low Integrity processes using icacls.
*/
private async denyLowIntegrityAccess(targetPath: string): Promise<void> {
if (os.platform() !== 'win32') {
return;
}
const resolvedPath = await tryRealpath(targetPath);
if (this.deniedCache.has(resolvedPath)) {
return;
}
// S-1-16-4096 is the SID for "Low Mandatory Level" (Low Integrity)
const LOW_INTEGRITY_SID = '*S-1-16-4096';
// icacls flags: (OI) Object Inherit, (CI) Container Inherit, (F) Full Access Deny.
// Omit /T (recursive) for performance; (OI)(CI) ensures inheritance for new items.
// Windows dynamically evaluates existing items, though deep explicit Allow ACEs
// could potentially bypass this inherited Deny rule.
const DENY_ALL_INHERIT = '(OI)(CI)(F)';
// icacls fails on non-existent paths, so we cannot explicitly deny
// paths that do not yet exist (unlike macOS/Linux).
// Skip to prevent sandbox initialization failure.
try {
await fs.promises.stat(resolvedPath);
} catch (e: unknown) {
if (isNodeError(e) && e.code === 'ENOENT') {
return;
}
throw e;
}
try {
await spawnAsync('icacls', [
resolvedPath,
'/deny',
`${LOW_INTEGRITY_SID}:${DENY_ALL_INHERIT}`,
]);
this.deniedCache.add(resolvedPath);
} catch (e) {
throw new Error(
`Failed to deny access to forbidden path: ${resolvedPath}. ${
e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)
}`,
);
}
}
}