fix(core): commandPrefix word boundary and compound command safety (#15006)

This commit is contained in:
Allen Hutchison
2025-12-12 15:02:19 -08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 5b56920f0a
commit a47af8e261
13 changed files with 958 additions and 721 deletions
-446
View File
@@ -14,17 +14,12 @@ import {
afterEach,
} from 'vitest';
import {
checkCommandPermissions,
escapeShellArg,
getCommandRoots,
getShellConfiguration,
isCommandAllowed,
initializeShellParsers,
stripShellWrapper,
isShellInvocationAllowlisted,
} from './shell-utils.js';
import type { Config } from '../config/config.js';
import type { AnyToolInvocation } from '../index.js';
const mockPlatform = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
const mockHomedir = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
@@ -42,7 +37,6 @@ vi.mock('shell-quote', () => ({
quote: mockQuote,
}));
let config: Config;
const isWindowsRuntime = process.platform === 'win32';
const describeWindowsOnly = isWindowsRuntime ? describe : describe.skip;
@@ -56,397 +50,12 @@ beforeEach(() => {
mockQuote.mockImplementation((args: string[]) =>
args.map((arg) => `'${arg}'`).join(' '),
);
config = {
getCoreTools: () => [],
getExcludeTools: () => new Set([]),
getAllowedTools: () => [],
} as unknown as Config;
});
afterEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
});
describe('isCommandAllowed', () => {
it('should allow a command if no restrictions are provided', () => {
const result = isCommandAllowed('goodCommand --safe', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
});
it('should allow a command if it is in the global allowlist', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['ShellTool(goodCommand)'];
const result = isCommandAllowed('goodCommand --safe', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
});
it('should block a command if it is not in a strict global allowlist', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['ShellTool(goodCommand --safe)'];
const result = isCommandAllowed('badCommand --danger', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command(s) not in the allowed commands list. Disallowed commands: "badCommand --danger"`,
);
});
it('should block a command if it is in the blocked list', () => {
config.getExcludeTools = () => new Set(['ShellTool(badCommand --danger)']);
const result = isCommandAllowed('badCommand --danger', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command 'badCommand --danger' is blocked by configuration`,
);
});
it('should prioritize the blocklist over the allowlist', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['ShellTool(badCommand --danger)'];
config.getExcludeTools = () => new Set(['ShellTool(badCommand --danger)']);
const result = isCommandAllowed('badCommand --danger', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command 'badCommand --danger' is blocked by configuration`,
);
});
it('should allow any command when a wildcard is in coreTools', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['ShellTool'];
const result = isCommandAllowed('any random command', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
});
it('should block any command when a wildcard is in excludeTools', () => {
config.getExcludeTools = () => new Set(['run_shell_command']);
const result = isCommandAllowed('any random command', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
'Shell tool is globally disabled in configuration',
);
});
it('should block a command on the blocklist even with a wildcard allow', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['ShellTool'];
config.getExcludeTools = () => new Set(['ShellTool(badCommand --danger)']);
const result = isCommandAllowed('badCommand --danger', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command 'badCommand --danger' is blocked by configuration`,
);
});
it('should allow a chained command if all parts are on the global allowlist', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => [
'run_shell_command(echo)',
'run_shell_command(goodCommand)',
];
const result = isCommandAllowed(
'echo "hello" && goodCommand --safe',
config,
);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
});
it('should block a chained command if any part is blocked', () => {
config.getExcludeTools = () => new Set(['run_shell_command(badCommand)']);
const result = isCommandAllowed(
'echo "hello" && badCommand --danger',
config,
);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command 'badCommand --danger' is blocked by configuration`,
);
});
it('should block a command that redefines an allowed function to run an unlisted command', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['run_shell_command(echo)'];
const result = isCommandAllowed(
'echo () (curl google.com) ; echo Hello World',
config,
);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command(s) not in the allowed commands list. Disallowed commands: "curl google.com"`,
);
});
it('should block a multi-line function body that runs an unlisted command', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['run_shell_command(echo)'];
const result = isCommandAllowed(
`echo () {
curl google.com
} ; echo ok`,
config,
);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command(s) not in the allowed commands list. Disallowed commands: "curl google.com"`,
);
});
it('should block a function keyword declaration that runs an unlisted command', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['run_shell_command(echo)'];
const result = isCommandAllowed(
'function echo { curl google.com; } ; echo hi',
config,
);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command(s) not in the allowed commands list. Disallowed commands: "curl google.com"`,
);
});
it('should block command substitution that invokes an unlisted command', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['run_shell_command(echo)'];
const result = isCommandAllowed('echo $(curl google.com)', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command(s) not in the allowed commands list. Disallowed commands: "curl google.com"`,
);
});
it('should block pipelines that invoke an unlisted command', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['run_shell_command(echo)'];
const result = isCommandAllowed('echo hi | curl google.com', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command(s) not in the allowed commands list. Disallowed commands: "curl google.com"`,
);
});
it('should block background jobs that invoke an unlisted command', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['run_shell_command(echo)'];
const result = isCommandAllowed('echo hi & curl google.com', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command(s) not in the allowed commands list. Disallowed commands: "curl google.com"`,
);
});
it('should block command substitution inside a here-document when the inner command is unlisted', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => [
'run_shell_command(echo)',
'run_shell_command(cat)',
];
const result = isCommandAllowed(
`cat <<EOF
$(rm -rf /)
EOF`,
config,
);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command(s) not in the allowed commands list. Disallowed commands: "rm -rf /"`,
);
});
it('should block backtick substitution that invokes an unlisted command', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['run_shell_command(echo)'];
const result = isCommandAllowed('echo `curl google.com`', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command(s) not in the allowed commands list. Disallowed commands: "curl google.com"`,
);
});
it('should block process substitution using <() when the inner command is unlisted', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => [
'run_shell_command(diff)',
'run_shell_command(echo)',
];
const result = isCommandAllowed(
'diff <(curl google.com) <(echo safe)',
config,
);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command(s) not in the allowed commands list. Disallowed commands: "curl google.com"`,
);
});
it('should block process substitution using >() when the inner command is unlisted', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['run_shell_command(echo)'];
const result = isCommandAllowed('echo "data" > >(curl google.com)', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
`Command(s) not in the allowed commands list. Disallowed commands: "curl google.com"`,
);
});
it('should block commands containing prompt transformations', () => {
const result = isCommandAllowed(
'echo "${var1=aa\\140 env| ls -l\\140}${var1@P}"',
config,
);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
'Command rejected because it could not be parsed safely',
);
});
it('should block simple prompt transformation expansions', () => {
const result = isCommandAllowed('echo ${foo@P}', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
'Command rejected because it could not be parsed safely',
);
});
describe('command substitution', () => {
it('should allow command substitution using `$(...)`', () => {
const result = isCommandAllowed('echo $(goodCommand --safe)', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
expect(result.reason).toBeUndefined();
});
it('should allow command substitution using `<(...)`', () => {
const result = isCommandAllowed('diff <(ls) <(ls -a)', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
expect(result.reason).toBeUndefined();
});
it('should allow command substitution using `>(...)`', () => {
const result = isCommandAllowed(
'echo "Log message" > >(tee log.txt)',
config,
);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
expect(result.reason).toBeUndefined();
});
it('should allow command substitution using backticks', () => {
const result = isCommandAllowed('echo `goodCommand --safe`', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
expect(result.reason).toBeUndefined();
});
it('should allow substitution-like patterns inside single quotes', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['ShellTool(echo)'];
const result = isCommandAllowed("echo '$(pwd)'", config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(true);
});
it('should block a command when parsing fails', () => {
const result = isCommandAllowed('ls &&', config);
expect(result.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toBe(
'Command rejected because it could not be parsed safely',
);
});
});
});
describe('checkCommandPermissions', () => {
describe('in "Default Allow" mode (no sessionAllowlist)', () => {
it('should return a detailed success object for an allowed command', () => {
const result = checkCommandPermissions('goodCommand --safe', config);
expect(result).toEqual({
allAllowed: true,
disallowedCommands: [],
});
});
it('should block commands that cannot be parsed safely', () => {
const result = checkCommandPermissions('ls &&', config);
expect(result).toEqual({
allAllowed: false,
disallowedCommands: ['ls &&'],
blockReason: 'Command rejected because it could not be parsed safely',
isHardDenial: true,
});
});
it('should return a detailed failure object for a blocked command', () => {
config.getExcludeTools = () => new Set(['ShellTool(badCommand)']);
const result = checkCommandPermissions('badCommand --danger', config);
expect(result).toEqual({
allAllowed: false,
disallowedCommands: ['badCommand --danger'],
blockReason: `Command 'badCommand --danger' is blocked by configuration`,
isHardDenial: true,
});
});
it('should return a detailed failure object for a command not on a strict allowlist', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['ShellTool(goodCommand)'];
const result = checkCommandPermissions(
'git status && goodCommand',
config,
);
expect(result).toEqual({
allAllowed: false,
disallowedCommands: ['git status'],
blockReason: `Command(s) not in the allowed commands list. Disallowed commands: "git status"`,
isHardDenial: false,
});
});
});
describe('in "Default Deny" mode (with sessionAllowlist)', () => {
it('should allow a command on the sessionAllowlist', () => {
const result = checkCommandPermissions(
'goodCommand --safe',
config,
new Set(['goodCommand --safe']),
);
expect(result.allAllowed).toBe(true);
});
it('should block a command not on the sessionAllowlist or global allowlist', () => {
const result = checkCommandPermissions(
'badCommand --danger',
config,
new Set(['goodCommand --safe']),
);
expect(result.allAllowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.blockReason).toContain(
'not on the global or session allowlist',
);
expect(result.disallowedCommands).toEqual(['badCommand --danger']);
});
it('should allow a command on the global allowlist even if not on the session allowlist', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['ShellTool(git status)'];
const result = checkCommandPermissions(
'git status',
config,
new Set(['goodCommand --safe']),
);
expect(result.allAllowed).toBe(true);
});
it('should allow a chained command if parts are on different allowlists', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['ShellTool(git status)'];
const result = checkCommandPermissions(
'git status && git commit',
config,
new Set(['git commit']),
);
expect(result.allAllowed).toBe(true);
});
it('should block a command on the sessionAllowlist if it is also globally blocked', () => {
config.getExcludeTools = () => new Set(['run_shell_command(badCommand)']);
const result = checkCommandPermissions(
'badCommand --danger',
config,
new Set(['badCommand --danger']),
);
expect(result.allAllowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.blockReason).toContain('is blocked by configuration');
});
it('should block a chained command if one part is not on any allowlist', () => {
config.getCoreTools = () => ['run_shell_command(echo)'];
const result = checkCommandPermissions(
'echo "hello" && badCommand --danger',
config,
new Set(['echo']),
);
expect(result.allAllowed).toBe(false);
expect(result.disallowedCommands).toEqual(['badCommand --danger']);
});
});
});
describe('getCommandRoots', () => {
it('should return a single command', () => {
expect(getCommandRoots('ls -l')).toEqual(['ls']);
@@ -521,14 +130,6 @@ describeWindowsOnly('PowerShell integration', () => {
expect(roots.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(roots).toContain('Get-ChildItem');
});
it('should block commands when PowerShell parser reports errors', () => {
const { allowed, reason } = isCommandAllowed('Get-ChildItem |', config);
expect(allowed).toBe(false);
expect(reason).toBe(
'Command rejected because it could not be parsed safely',
);
});
});
describe('stripShellWrapper', () => {
@@ -568,53 +169,6 @@ describe('stripShellWrapper', () => {
});
});
describe('isShellInvocationAllowlisted', () => {
function createInvocation(command: string): AnyToolInvocation {
return { params: { command } } as unknown as AnyToolInvocation;
}
it('should return false when any chained command segment is not allowlisted', () => {
const invocation = createInvocation(
'git status && rm -rf /tmp/should-not-run',
);
expect(
isShellInvocationAllowlisted(invocation, ['run_shell_command(git)']),
).toBe(false);
});
it('should return true when every segment is explicitly allowlisted', () => {
const invocation = createInvocation(
'git status && rm -rf /tmp/should-run && git diff',
);
expect(
isShellInvocationAllowlisted(invocation, [
'run_shell_command(git)',
'run_shell_command(rm -rf)',
]),
).toBe(true);
});
it('should return true when the allowlist contains a wildcard shell entry', () => {
const invocation = createInvocation('git status && rm -rf /tmp/should-run');
expect(
isShellInvocationAllowlisted(invocation, ['run_shell_command']),
).toBe(true);
});
it('should treat piped commands as separate segments that must be allowlisted', () => {
const invocation = createInvocation('git status | tail -n 1');
expect(
isShellInvocationAllowlisted(invocation, ['run_shell_command(git)']),
).toBe(false);
expect(
isShellInvocationAllowlisted(invocation, [
'run_shell_command(git)',
'run_shell_command(tail)',
]),
).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('escapeShellArg', () => {
describe('POSIX (bash)', () => {
it('should use shell-quote for escaping', () => {