fix(core): commandPrefix word boundary and compound command safety (#15006)

This commit is contained in:
Allen Hutchison
2025-12-12 15:02:19 -08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 5b56920f0a
commit a47af8e261
13 changed files with 958 additions and 721 deletions
+4 -261
View File
@@ -4,11 +4,8 @@
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
import type { AnyToolInvocation } from '../index.js';
import type { Config } from '../config/config.js';
import os from 'node:os';
import { quote } from 'shell-quote';
import { doesToolInvocationMatch } from './tool-utils.js';
import {
spawn,
spawnSync,
@@ -107,7 +104,7 @@ export async function initializeShellParsers(): Promise<void> {
await treeSitterInitialization;
}
interface ParsedCommandDetail {
export interface ParsedCommandDetail {
name: string;
text: string;
}
@@ -399,7 +396,9 @@ function parsePowerShellCommandDetails(
}
}
function parseCommandDetails(command: string): CommandParseResult | null {
export function parseCommandDetails(
command: string,
): CommandParseResult | null {
const configuration = getShellConfiguration();
if (configuration.shell === 'powershell') {
@@ -552,178 +551,6 @@ export function stripShellWrapper(command: string): string {
* @param command The shell command string to check
* @returns true if command substitution would be executed by bash
*/
/**
* Checks a shell command against security policies and allowlists.
*
* This function operates in one of two modes depending on the presence of
* the `sessionAllowlist` parameter:
*
* 1. **"Default Deny" Mode (sessionAllowlist is provided):** This is the
* strictest mode, used for user-defined scripts like custom commands.
* A command is only permitted if it is found on the global `coreTools`
* allowlist OR the provided `sessionAllowlist`. It must not be on the
* global `excludeTools` blocklist.
*
* 2. **"Default Allow" Mode (sessionAllowlist is NOT provided):** This mode
* is used for direct tool invocations (e.g., by the model). If a strict
* global `coreTools` allowlist exists, commands must be on it. Otherwise,
* any command is permitted as long as it is not on the `excludeTools`
* blocklist.
*
* @param command The shell command string to validate.
* @param config The application configuration.
* @param sessionAllowlist A session-level list of approved commands. Its
* presence activates "Default Deny" mode.
* @returns An object detailing which commands are not allowed.
*/
export function checkCommandPermissions(
command: string,
config: Config,
sessionAllowlist?: Set<string>,
): {
allAllowed: boolean;
disallowedCommands: string[];
blockReason?: string;
isHardDenial?: boolean;
} {
const parseResult = parseCommandDetails(command);
if (!parseResult || parseResult.hasError) {
return {
allAllowed: false,
disallowedCommands: [command],
blockReason: 'Command rejected because it could not be parsed safely',
isHardDenial: true,
};
}
const normalize = (cmd: string): string => cmd.trim().replace(/\s+/g, ' ');
const commandsToValidate = parseResult.details
.map((detail) => normalize(detail.text))
.filter(Boolean);
const invocation: AnyToolInvocation & { params: { command: string } } = {
params: { command: '' },
} as AnyToolInvocation & { params: { command: string } };
// 1. Blocklist Check (Highest Priority)
const excludeTools = config.getExcludeTools() || new Set([]);
const isWildcardBlocked = SHELL_TOOL_NAMES.some((name) =>
excludeTools.has(name),
);
if (isWildcardBlocked) {
return {
allAllowed: false,
disallowedCommands: commandsToValidate,
blockReason: 'Shell tool is globally disabled in configuration',
isHardDenial: true,
};
}
for (const cmd of commandsToValidate) {
invocation.params['command'] = cmd;
if (
doesToolInvocationMatch('run_shell_command', invocation, [
...excludeTools,
])
) {
return {
allAllowed: false,
disallowedCommands: [cmd],
blockReason: `Command '${cmd}' is blocked by configuration`,
isHardDenial: true,
};
}
}
const coreTools = config.getCoreTools() || [];
const isWildcardAllowed = SHELL_TOOL_NAMES.some((name) =>
coreTools.includes(name),
);
// If there's a global wildcard, all commands are allowed at this point
// because they have already passed the blocklist check.
if (isWildcardAllowed) {
return { allAllowed: true, disallowedCommands: [] };
}
const disallowedCommands: string[] = [];
if (sessionAllowlist) {
// "DEFAULT DENY" MODE: A session allowlist is provided.
// All commands must be in either the session or global allowlist.
const normalizedSessionAllowlist = new Set(
[...sessionAllowlist].flatMap((cmd) =>
SHELL_TOOL_NAMES.map((name) => `${name}(${cmd})`),
),
);
for (const cmd of commandsToValidate) {
invocation.params['command'] = cmd;
const isSessionAllowed = doesToolInvocationMatch(
'run_shell_command',
invocation,
[...normalizedSessionAllowlist],
);
if (isSessionAllowed) continue;
const isGloballyAllowed = doesToolInvocationMatch(
'run_shell_command',
invocation,
coreTools,
);
if (isGloballyAllowed) continue;
disallowedCommands.push(cmd);
}
if (disallowedCommands.length > 0) {
return {
allAllowed: false,
disallowedCommands,
blockReason: `Command(s) not on the global or session allowlist. Disallowed commands: ${disallowedCommands
.map((c) => JSON.stringify(c))
.join(', ')}`,
isHardDenial: false, // This is a soft denial; confirmation is possible.
};
}
} else {
// "DEFAULT ALLOW" MODE: No session allowlist.
const hasSpecificAllowedCommands =
coreTools.filter((tool) =>
SHELL_TOOL_NAMES.some((name) => tool.startsWith(`${name}(`)),
).length > 0;
if (hasSpecificAllowedCommands) {
for (const cmd of commandsToValidate) {
invocation.params['command'] = cmd;
const isGloballyAllowed = doesToolInvocationMatch(
'run_shell_command',
invocation,
coreTools,
);
if (!isGloballyAllowed) {
disallowedCommands.push(cmd);
}
}
if (disallowedCommands.length > 0) {
return {
allAllowed: false,
disallowedCommands,
blockReason: `Command(s) not in the allowed commands list. Disallowed commands: ${disallowedCommands
.map((c) => JSON.stringify(c))
.join(', ')}`,
isHardDenial: false, // This is a soft denial.
};
}
}
// If no specific global allowlist exists, and it passed the blocklist,
// the command is allowed by default.
}
// If all checks for the current mode pass, the command is allowed.
return { allAllowed: true, disallowedCommands: [] };
}
/**
* Determines whether a given shell command is allowed to execute based on
* the tool's configuration including allowlists and blocklists.
@@ -765,87 +592,3 @@ export const spawnAsync = (
reject(err);
});
});
export function isCommandAllowed(
command: string,
config: Config,
): { allowed: boolean; reason?: string } {
// By not providing a sessionAllowlist, we invoke "default allow" behavior.
const { allAllowed, blockReason } = checkCommandPermissions(command, config);
if (allAllowed) {
return { allowed: true };
}
return { allowed: false, reason: blockReason };
}
/**
* Determines whether a shell invocation should be auto-approved based on an allowlist.
*
* This reuses the same parsing logic as command-permission enforcement so that
* chained commands must be individually covered by the allowlist.
*
* @param invocation The shell tool invocation being evaluated.
* @param allowedPatterns The configured allowlist patterns (e.g. `run_shell_command(git)`).
* @returns True if every parsed command segment is allowed by the patterns; false otherwise.
*/
export function isShellInvocationAllowlisted(
invocation: AnyToolInvocation,
allowedPatterns: string[],
): boolean {
if (!allowedPatterns.length) {
return false;
}
const hasShellWildcard = allowedPatterns.some((pattern) =>
SHELL_TOOL_NAMES.includes(pattern),
);
const hasShellSpecificPattern = allowedPatterns.some((pattern) =>
SHELL_TOOL_NAMES.some((name) => pattern.startsWith(`${name}(`)),
);
if (!hasShellWildcard && !hasShellSpecificPattern) {
return false;
}
if (hasShellWildcard) {
return true;
}
if (
!('params' in invocation) ||
typeof invocation.params !== 'object' ||
invocation.params === null ||
!('command' in invocation.params)
) {
return false;
}
const commandValue = (invocation.params as { command?: unknown }).command;
if (typeof commandValue !== 'string' || !commandValue.trim()) {
return false;
}
const command = commandValue.trim();
const parseResult = parseCommandDetails(command);
if (!parseResult || parseResult.hasError) {
return false;
}
const normalize = (cmd: string): string => cmd.trim().replace(/\s+/g, ' ');
const commandsToValidate = parseResult.details
.map((detail) => normalize(detail.text))
.filter(Boolean);
if (commandsToValidate.length === 0) {
return false;
}
return commandsToValidate.every((commandSegment) =>
doesToolInvocationMatch(
SHELL_TOOL_NAMES[0],
{ params: { command: commandSegment } } as AnyToolInvocation,
allowedPatterns,
),
);
}