feat(security): implement robust IP validation and safeFetch foundation (#21401)

packages/core/package.json

@@ -21,11 +21,13 @@
     "dist"
   ],
   "dependencies": {
-    "@a2a-js/sdk": "^0.3.8",
+    "@a2a-js/sdk": "^0.3.10",
+    "@bufbuild/protobuf": "^2.11.0",
     "@google-cloud/logging": "^11.2.1",
     "@google-cloud/opentelemetry-cloud-monitoring-exporter": "^0.21.0",
     "@google-cloud/opentelemetry-cloud-trace-exporter": "^3.0.0",
     "@google/genai": "1.41.0",
+    "@grpc/grpc-js": "^1.14.3",
     "@iarna/toml": "^2.2.5",
     "@joshua.litt/get-ripgrep": "^0.0.3",
     "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.23.0",
@@ -63,6 +65,7 @@
     "html-to-text": "^9.0.5",
     "https-proxy-agent": "^7.0.6",
     "ignore": "^7.0.0",
+    "ipaddr.js": "^1.9.1",
     "js-yaml": "^4.1.1",
     "marked": "^15.0.12",
     "mime": "4.0.7",

packages/core/src/agents/a2a-client-manager.ts

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import {
 import { v4 as uuidv4 } from 'uuid';
 import { Agent as UndiciAgent } from 'undici';
 import { debugLogger } from '../utils/debugLogger.js';
+import { safeLookup } from '../utils/fetch.js';
 
 // Remote agents can take 10+ minutes (e.g. Deep Research).
 // Use a dedicated dispatcher so the global 5-min timeout isn't affected.
@@ -32,10 +33,13 @@ const A2A_TIMEOUT = 1800000; // 30 minutes
 const a2aDispatcher = new UndiciAgent({
   headersTimeout: A2A_TIMEOUT,
   bodyTimeout: A2A_TIMEOUT,
+  connect: {
+    lookup: safeLookup, // SSRF protection at connection level
+  },
 });
 const a2aFetch: typeof fetch = (input, init) =>
-  // @ts-expect-error The `dispatcher` property is a Node.js extension to fetch not present in standard types.
-  fetch(input, { ...init, dispatcher: a2aDispatcher });
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- TODO: Migrate to safeFetch for SSRF protection
+  fetch(input, { ...init, dispatcher: a2aDispatcher } as RequestInit);
 
 export type SendMessageResult =
   | Message

packages/core/src/code_assist/oauth2.ts

@@ -700,6 +700,7 @@ async function fetchAndCacheUserInfo(client: OAuth2Client): Promise<void> {
       return;
     }
 
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- TODO: Migrate to safeFetch for SSRF protection
     const response = await fetch(
       'https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v2/userinfo',
       {

packages/core/src/mcp/oauth-provider.ts

@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ export class MCPOAuthProvider {
       scope: config.scopes?.join(' ') || '',
     };
 
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- TODO: Migrate to safeFetch for SSRF protection
     const response = await fetch(registrationUrl, {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: {
@@ -300,6 +301,7 @@ export class MCPOAuthProvider {
           ? { Accept: 'text/event-stream' }
           : { Accept: 'application/json' };
 
+        // eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- TODO: Migrate to safeFetch for SSRF protection
         const response = await fetch(mcpServerUrl, {
           method: 'HEAD',
           headers,

packages/core/src/mcp/oauth-utils.ts

@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ export class OAuthUtils {
     resourceMetadataUrl: string,
   ): Promise<OAuthProtectedResourceMetadata | null> {
     try {
+      // eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- TODO: Migrate to safeFetch for SSRF protection
       const response = await fetch(resourceMetadataUrl);
       if (!response.ok) {
         return null;
@@ -121,6 +122,7 @@ export class OAuthUtils {
     authServerMetadataUrl: string,
   ): Promise<OAuthAuthorizationServerMetadata | null> {
     try {
+      // eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- TODO: Migrate to safeFetch for SSRF protection
       const response = await fetch(authServerMetadataUrl);
       if (!response.ok) {
         return null;

packages/core/src/telemetry/clearcut-logger/clearcut-logger.ts

@@ -474,6 +474,7 @@ export class ClearcutLogger {
     let result: LogResponse = {};
 
     try {
+      // eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- TODO: Migrate to safeFetch for SSRF protection
       const response = await fetch(CLEARCUT_URL, {
         method: 'POST',
         body: safeJsonStringify(request),

packages/core/src/tools/mcp-client.ts

@@ -1903,6 +1903,7 @@ export async function connectToMcpServer(
             acceptHeader = 'application/json';
           }
 
+          // eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- TODO: Migrate to safeFetch for SSRF protection
           const response = await fetch(urlToFetch, {
             method: 'HEAD',
             headers: {

packages/core/src/utils/fetch.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+/**
+ * @license
+ * Copyright 2025 Google LLC
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterAll } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  isPrivateIp,
+  isPrivateIpAsync,
+  isAddressPrivate,
+  safeLookup,
+  safeFetch,
+  fetchWithTimeout,
+  PrivateIpError,
+} from './fetch.js';
+import * as dnsPromises from 'node:dns/promises';
+import * as dns from 'node:dns';
+
+vi.mock('node:dns/promises', () => ({
+  lookup: vi.fn(),
+}));
+
+// We need to mock node:dns for safeLookup since it uses the callback API
+vi.mock('node:dns', () => ({
+  lookup: vi.fn(),
+}));
+
+// Mock global fetch
+const originalFetch = global.fetch;
+global.fetch = vi.fn();
+
+describe('fetch utils', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    vi.clearAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  afterAll(() => {
+    global.fetch = originalFetch;
+  });
+
+  describe('isAddressPrivate', () => {
+    it('should identify private IPv4 addresses', () => {
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('10.0.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('127.0.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('172.16.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('192.168.1.1')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('should identify non-routable and reserved IPv4 addresses (RFC 6890)', () => {
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('0.0.0.0')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('100.64.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('192.0.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('192.0.2.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('192.88.99.1')).toBe(true);
+      // Benchmark range (198.18.0.0/15)
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('198.18.0.0')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('198.18.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('198.19.255.255')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('198.51.100.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('203.0.113.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('224.0.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('240.0.0.1')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('should identify private IPv6 addresses', () => {
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('::1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('fc00::')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('fd00::')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('fe80::')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('febf::')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('should identify special local addresses', () => {
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('0.0.0.0')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('::')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('localhost')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('should identify link-local addresses', () => {
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('169.254.169.254')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('should identify IPv4-mapped IPv6 private addresses', () => {
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('::ffff:127.0.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('::ffff:10.0.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('::ffff:169.254.169.254')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('::ffff:192.168.1.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('::ffff:172.16.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('::ffff:0.0.0.0')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('::ffff:100.64.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('::ffff:a9fe:101')).toBe(true); // 169.254.1.1
+    });
+
+    it('should identify public addresses as non-private', () => {
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('8.8.8.8')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('93.184.216.34')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('2001:4860:4860::8888')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isAddressPrivate('::ffff:8.8.8.8')).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('isPrivateIp', () => {
+    it('should identify private IPs in URLs', () => {
+      expect(isPrivateIp('http://10.0.0.1/')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isPrivateIp('https://127.0.0.1:8080/')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isPrivateIp('http://localhost/')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isPrivateIp('http://[::1]/')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('should identify public IPs in URLs as non-private', () => {
+      expect(isPrivateIp('http://8.8.8.8/')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isPrivateIp('https://google.com/')).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('isPrivateIpAsync', () => {
+    it('should identify private IPs directly', async () => {
+      expect(await isPrivateIpAsync('http://10.0.0.1/')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('should identify domains resolving to private IPs', async () => {
+      vi.mocked(dnsPromises.lookup).mockImplementation(
+        async () =>
+          // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
+          [{ address: '10.0.0.1', family: 4 }] as any,
+      );
+      expect(await isPrivateIpAsync('http://malicious.com/')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('should identify domains resolving to public IPs as non-private', async () => {
+      vi.mocked(dnsPromises.lookup).mockImplementation(
+        async () =>
+          // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
+          [{ address: '8.8.8.8', family: 4 }] as any,
+      );
+      expect(await isPrivateIpAsync('http://google.com/')).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('should throw error if DNS resolution fails (fail closed)', async () => {
+      vi.mocked(dnsPromises.lookup).mockRejectedValue(new Error('DNS Error'));
+      await expect(isPrivateIpAsync('http://unreachable.com/')).rejects.toThrow(
+        'Failed to verify if URL resolves to private IP',
+      );
+    });
+
+    it('should return false for invalid URLs instead of throwing verification error', async () => {
+      expect(await isPrivateIpAsync('not-a-url')).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('safeLookup', () => {
+    it('should filter out private IPs', async () => {
+      const addresses = [
+        { address: '8.8.8.8', family: 4 },
+        { address: '10.0.0.1', family: 4 },
+      ];
+
+      vi.mocked(dns.lookup).mockImplementation(((
+        _h: string,
+        _o: dns.LookupOptions,
+        cb: (
+          err: Error | null,
+          addr: Array<{ address: string; family: number }>,
+        ) => void,
+      ) => {
+        cb(null, addresses);
+        // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
+      }) as any);
+
+      const result = await new Promise<
+        Array<{ address: string; family: number }>
+      >((resolve, reject) => {
+        safeLookup('example.com', { all: true }, (err, filtered) => {
+          if (err) reject(err);
+          else resolve(filtered);
+        });
+      });
+
+      expect(result).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(result[0].address).toBe('8.8.8.8');
+    });
+
+    it('should allow explicit localhost', async () => {
+      const addresses = [{ address: '127.0.0.1', family: 4 }];
+
+      vi.mocked(dns.lookup).mockImplementation(((
+        _h: string,
+        _o: dns.LookupOptions,
+        cb: (
+          err: Error | null,
+          addr: Array<{ address: string; family: number }>,
+        ) => void,
+      ) => {
+        cb(null, addresses);
+        // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
+      }) as any);
+
+      const result = await new Promise<
+        Array<{ address: string; family: number }>
+      >((resolve, reject) => {
+        safeLookup('localhost', { all: true }, (err, filtered) => {
+          if (err) reject(err);
+          else resolve(filtered);
+        });
+      });
+
+      expect(result).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(result[0].address).toBe('127.0.0.1');
+    });
+
+    it('should error if all resolved IPs are private', async () => {
+      const addresses = [{ address: '10.0.0.1', family: 4 }];
+
+      vi.mocked(dns.lookup).mockImplementation(((
+        _h: string,
+        _o: dns.LookupOptions,
+        cb: (
+          err: Error | null,
+          addr: Array<{ address: string; family: number }>,
+        ) => void,
+      ) => {
+        cb(null, addresses);
+        // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
+      }) as any);
+
+      await expect(
+        new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+          safeLookup('malicious.com', { all: true }, (err, filtered) => {
+            if (err) reject(err);
+            else resolve(filtered);
+          });
+        }),
+      ).rejects.toThrow(PrivateIpError);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('safeFetch', () => {
+    it('should forward to fetch with dispatcher', async () => {
+      vi.mocked(global.fetch).mockResolvedValue(new Response('ok'));
+
+      const response = await safeFetch('https://example.com');
+      expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(global.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+        'https://example.com',
+        expect.objectContaining({
+          dispatcher: expect.any(Object),
+        }),
+      );
+    });
+
+    it('should handle Refusing to connect errors', async () => {
+      vi.mocked(global.fetch).mockRejectedValue(new PrivateIpError());
+
+      await expect(safeFetch('http://10.0.0.1')).rejects.toThrow(
+        'Access to private network is blocked',
+      );
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('fetchWithTimeout', () => {
+    it('should handle timeouts', async () => {
+      vi.mocked(global.fetch).mockImplementation(
+        (_input, init) =>
+          new Promise((_resolve, reject) => {
+            if (init?.signal) {
+              init.signal.addEventListener('abort', () => {
+                const error = new Error('The operation was aborted');
+                error.name = 'AbortError';
+                // @ts-expect-error - for mocking purposes
+                error.code = 'ABORT_ERR';
+                reject(error);
+              });
+            }
+          }),
+      );
+
+      await expect(fetchWithTimeout('http://example.com', 50)).rejects.toThrow(
+        'Request timed out after 50ms',
+      );
+    });
+
+    it('should handle private IP errors via handleFetchError', async () => {
+      vi.mocked(global.fetch).mockRejectedValue(new PrivateIpError());
+
+      await expect(fetchWithTimeout('http://10.0.0.1', 1000)).rejects.toThrow(
+        'Access to private network is blocked: http://10.0.0.1',
+      );
+    });
+  });
+});

packages/core/src/utils/fetch.ts

@@ -6,7 +6,10 @@
 
 import { getErrorMessage, isNodeError } from './errors.js';
 import { URL } from 'node:url';
+import * as dns from 'node:dns';
+import { lookup } from 'node:dns/promises';
 import { Agent, ProxyAgent, setGlobalDispatcher } from 'undici';
+import ipaddr from 'ipaddr.js';
 
 const DEFAULT_HEADERS_TIMEOUT = 300000; // 5 minutes
 const DEFAULT_BODY_TIMEOUT = 300000; // 5 minutes
@@ -19,15 +22,20 @@ setGlobalDispatcher(
   }),
 );
 
-const PRIVATE_IP_RANGES = [
-  /^10\./,
-  /^127\./,
-  /^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\./,
-  /^192\.168\./,
-  /^::1$/,
-  /^fc00:/,
-  /^fe80:/,
-];
+// Local extension of RequestInit to support Node.js/undici dispatcher
+interface NodeFetchInit extends RequestInit {
+  dispatcher?: Agent | ProxyAgent;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Error thrown when a connection to a private IP address is blocked for security reasons.
+ */
+export class PrivateIpError extends Error {
+  constructor(message = 'Refusing to connect to private IP address') {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'PrivateIpError';
+  }
+}
 
 export class FetchError extends Error {
   constructor(
@@ -40,15 +48,234 @@ export class FetchError extends Error {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Sanitizes a hostname by stripping IPv6 brackets if present.
+ */
+export function sanitizeHostname(hostname: string): string {
+  return hostname.startsWith('[') && hostname.endsWith(']')
+    ? hostname.slice(1, -1)
+    : hostname;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Checks if a hostname is a local loopback address allowed for development/testing.
+ */
+export function isLoopbackHost(hostname: string): boolean {
+  const sanitized = sanitizeHostname(hostname);
+  return (
+    sanitized === 'localhost' ||
+    sanitized === '127.0.0.1' ||
+    sanitized === '::1'
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * A custom DNS lookup implementation for undici agents that prevents
+ * connection to private IP ranges (SSRF protection).
+ */
+export function safeLookup(
+  hostname: string,
+  options: dns.LookupOptions | number | null | undefined,
+  callback: (
+    err: Error | null,
+    addresses: Array<{ address: string; family: number }>,
+  ) => void,
+): void {
+  // Use the callback-based dns.lookup to match undici's expected signature.
+  // We explicitly handle the 'all' option to ensure we get an array of addresses.
+  const lookupOptions =
+    typeof options === 'number' ? { family: options } : { ...options };
+  const finalOptions = { ...lookupOptions, all: true };
+
+  dns.lookup(hostname, finalOptions, (err, addresses) => {
+    if (err) {
+      callback(err, []);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const addressArray = Array.isArray(addresses) ? addresses : [];
+    const filtered = addressArray.filter(
+      (addr) => !isAddressPrivate(addr.address) || isLoopbackHost(hostname),
+    );
+
+    if (filtered.length === 0 && addressArray.length > 0) {
+      callback(new PrivateIpError(), []);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    callback(null, filtered);
+  });
+}
+
+// Dedicated dispatcher with connection-level SSRF protection (safeLookup)
+const safeDispatcher = new Agent({
+  headersTimeout: DEFAULT_HEADERS_TIMEOUT,
+  bodyTimeout: DEFAULT_BODY_TIMEOUT,
+  connect: {
+    lookup: safeLookup,
+  },
+});
+
 export function isPrivateIp(url: string): boolean {
   try {
     const hostname = new URL(url).hostname;
-    return PRIVATE_IP_RANGES.some((range) => range.test(hostname));
-  } catch (_e) {
+    return isAddressPrivate(hostname);
+  } catch {
     return false;
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Checks if a URL resolves to a private IP address.
+ * Performs DNS resolution to prevent DNS rebinding/SSRF bypasses.
+ */
+export async function isPrivateIpAsync(url: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  try {
+    const parsed = new URL(url);
+    const hostname = parsed.hostname;
+
+    // Fast check for literal IPs or localhost
+    if (isAddressPrivate(hostname)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+
+    // Resolve DNS to check the actual target IP
+    const addresses = await lookup(hostname, { all: true });
+    return addresses.some((addr) => isAddressPrivate(addr.address));
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (
+      e instanceof Error &&
+      e.name === 'TypeError' &&
+      e.message.includes('Invalid URL')
+    ) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    throw new Error(`Failed to verify if URL resolves to private IP: ${url}`, {
+      cause: e,
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * IANA Benchmark Testing Range (198.18.0.0/15).
+ * Classified as 'unicast' by ipaddr.js but is reserved and should not be
+ * accessible as public internet.
+ */
+const IANA_BENCHMARK_RANGE = ipaddr.parseCIDR('198.18.0.0/15');
+
+/**
+ * Checks if an address falls within the IANA benchmark testing range.
+ */
+function isBenchmarkAddress(addr: ipaddr.IPv4 | ipaddr.IPv6): boolean {
+  const [rangeAddr, rangeMask] = IANA_BENCHMARK_RANGE;
+  return (
+    addr instanceof ipaddr.IPv4 &&
+    rangeAddr instanceof ipaddr.IPv4 &&
+    addr.match(rangeAddr, rangeMask)
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Internal helper to check if an IP address string is in a private or reserved range.
+ */
+export function isAddressPrivate(address: string): boolean {
+  const sanitized = sanitizeHostname(address);
+
+  if (sanitized === 'localhost') {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  try {
+    if (!ipaddr.isValid(sanitized)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    const addr = ipaddr.parse(sanitized);
+
+    // Special handling for IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:x.x.x.x)
+    // We unmap it and check the underlying IPv4 address.
+    if (addr instanceof ipaddr.IPv6 && addr.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
+      return isAddressPrivate(addr.toIPv4Address().toString());
+    }
+
+    // Explicitly block IANA benchmark testing range.
+    if (isBenchmarkAddress(addr)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+
+    return addr.range() !== 'unicast';
+  } catch {
+    // If parsing fails despite isValid(), we treat it as potentially unsafe.
+    return true;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Internal helper to map varied fetch errors to a standardized FetchError.
+ * Centralizes security-related error mapping (e.g. PrivateIpError).
+ */
+function handleFetchError(error: unknown, url: string): never {
+  if (error instanceof PrivateIpError) {
+    throw new FetchError(
+      `Access to private network is blocked: ${url}`,
+      'ERR_PRIVATE_NETWORK',
+      { cause: error },
+    );
+  }
+
+  if (error instanceof FetchError) {
+    throw error;
+  }
+
+  throw new FetchError(
+    getErrorMessage(error),
+    isNodeError(error) ? error.code : undefined,
+    { cause: error },
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Enhanced fetch with SSRF protection.
+ * Prevents access to private/internal networks at the connection level.
+ */
+export async function safeFetch(
+  input: RequestInfo | URL,
+  init?: RequestInit,
+): Promise<Response> {
+  const nodeInit: NodeFetchInit = {
+    ...init,
+    dispatcher: safeDispatcher,
+  };
+
+  try {
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax
+    return await fetch(input, nodeInit);
+  } catch (error) {
+    const url =
+      input instanceof Request
+        ? input.url
+        : typeof input === 'string'
+          ? input
+          : input.toString();
+    handleFetchError(error, url);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Creates an undici ProxyAgent that incorporates safe DNS lookup.
+ */
+export function createSafeProxyAgent(proxyUrl: string): ProxyAgent {
+  return new ProxyAgent({
+    uri: proxyUrl,
+    connect: {
+      lookup: safeLookup,
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Performs a fetch with a specified timeout and connection-level SSRF protection.
+ */
 export async function fetchWithTimeout(
   url: string,
   timeout: number,
@@ -67,17 +294,21 @@ export async function fetchWithTimeout(
     }
   }
 
+  const nodeInit: NodeFetchInit = {
+    ...options,
+    signal: controller.signal,
+    dispatcher: safeDispatcher,
+  };
+
   try {
-    const response = await fetch(url, {
-      ...options,
-      signal: controller.signal,
-    });
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax
+    const response = await fetch(url, nodeInit);
     return response;
   } catch (error) {
     if (isNodeError(error) && error.code === 'ABORT_ERR') {
       throw new FetchError(`Request timed out after ${timeout}ms`, 'ETIMEDOUT');
     }
-    throw new FetchError(getErrorMessage(error), undefined, { cause: error });
+    handleFetchError(error, url.toString());
   } finally {
     clearTimeout(timeoutId);
   }

packages/core/src/utils/oauth-flow.ts

@@ -454,6 +454,7 @@ export async function exchangeCodeForToken(
     params.append('resource', resource);
   }
 
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- TODO: Migrate to safeFetch for SSRF protection
   const response = await fetch(config.tokenUrl, {
     method: 'POST',
     headers: {
@@ -507,6 +508,7 @@ export async function refreshAccessToken(
     params.append('resource', resource);
   }
 
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- TODO: Migrate to safeFetch for SSRF protection
   const response = await fetch(tokenUrl, {
     method: 'POST',
     headers: {