/**
 * @license
 * Copyright 2026 Google LLC
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 */
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'vitest';
import { createSandboxManager } from './sandboxManagerFactory.js';
import { ShellExecutionService } from './shellExecutionService.js';
import { getSecureSanitizationConfig } from './environmentSanitization.js';
import {
  type SandboxManager,
  type SandboxedCommand,
} from './sandboxManager.js';
import { execFile } from 'node:child_process';
import { promisify } from 'node:util';
import os from 'node:os';
import fs from 'node:fs';
import path from 'node:path';
import http from 'node:http';

/**
 * Cross-platform command wrappers using Node.js inline scripts.
 * Ensures consistent execution behavior and reliable exit codes across
 * different host operating systems and restricted sandbox environments.
 */
const Platform = {
  isWindows: os.platform() === 'win32',
  isMac: os.platform() === 'darwin',

  /** Returns a command to create an empty file. */
  touch(filePath: string) {
    return {
      command: process.execPath,
      args: [
        '-e',
        `require("node:fs").writeFileSync(${JSON.stringify(filePath)}, "")`,
      ],
    };
  },

  /** Returns a command to read a file's content. */
  cat(filePath: string) {
    return {
      command: process.execPath,
      args: [
        '-e',
        `console.log(require("node:fs").readFileSync(${JSON.stringify(filePath)}, "utf8"))`,
      ],
    };
  },

  /** Returns a command to echo a string. */
  echo(text: string) {
    return {
      command: process.execPath,
      args: ['-e', `console.log(${JSON.stringify(text)})`],
    };
  },

  /** Returns a command to perform a network request. */
  curl(url: string) {
    return {
      command: process.execPath,
      args: [
        '-e',
        `require("node:http").get(${JSON.stringify(url)}, (res) => { res.on("data", (d) => process.stdout.write(d)); res.on("end", () => process.exit(0)); }).on("error", () => process.exit(1));`,
      ],
    };
  },

  /** Returns a command that checks if the current terminal is interactive. */
  isPty() {
    // ShellExecutionService.execute expects a raw shell string
    return `"${process.execPath}" -e "console.log(process.stdout.isTTY ? 'True' : 'False')"`;
  },

  /** Returns a path that is strictly outside the workspace and likely blocked. */
  getExternalBlockedPath() {
    return this.isWindows
      ? 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts'
      : '/Users/Shared/.gemini_test_blocked';
  },
};

async function runCommand(command: SandboxedCommand) {
  try {
    const { stdout, stderr } = await promisify(execFile)(
      command.program,
      command.args,
      {
        cwd: command.cwd,
        env: command.env,
        encoding: 'utf-8',
      },
    );
    return { status: 0, stdout, stderr };
  } catch (error: unknown) {
    const err = error as { code?: number; stdout?: string; stderr?: string };
    return {
      status: err.code ?? 1,
      stdout: err.stdout ?? '',
      stderr: err.stderr ?? '',
    };
  }
}

/**
 * Asserts the result of a sandboxed command execution, and provides detailed
 * diagnostics on failure.
 */
function assertResult(
  result: { status: number; stdout: string; stderr: string },
  command: SandboxedCommand,
  expected: 'success' | 'failure',
) {
  const isSuccess = result.status === 0;
  const shouldBeSuccess = expected === 'success';

  if (isSuccess === shouldBeSuccess) {
    if (shouldBeSuccess) {
      expect(result.status).toBe(0);
    } else {
      expect(result.status).not.toBe(0);
    }
    return;
  }

  const commandLine = `${command.program} ${command.args.join(' ')}`;
  const message = `Command ${
    shouldBeSuccess ? 'failed' : 'succeeded'
  } unexpectedly.
Command: ${commandLine}
CWD: ${command.cwd || 'N/A'}
Status: ${result.status} (expected ${expected})${
    result.stdout ? `\nStdout: ${result.stdout.trim()}` : ''
  }${result.stderr ? `\nStderr: ${result.stderr.trim()}` : ''}`;

  throw new Error(message);
}

describe('SandboxManager Integration', () => {
  const tempDirectories: string[] = [];

  /**
   * Creates a temporary directory.
   * - macOS: Created in process.cwd() to avoid the seatbelt profile's global os.tmpdir() whitelist.
   * - Win/Linux: Created in os.tmpdir() because enforcing sandbox restrictions inside a large directory can be very slow.
   */
  function createTempDir(prefix = 'gemini-sandbox-test-'): string {
    const baseDir = Platform.isMac
      ? path.join(process.cwd(), `.${prefix}`)
      : path.join(os.tmpdir(), prefix);

    const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(baseDir);
    tempDirectories.push(dir);
    return dir;
  }

  let workspace: string;
  let manager: SandboxManager;

  beforeAll(() => {
    workspace = createTempDir('workspace-');
    manager = createSandboxManager({ enabled: true }, { workspace });
  });

  afterAll(() => {
    for (const dir of tempDirectories) {
      try {
        fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
      } catch {
        // Best-effort cleanup
      }
    }
  });

  describe('Basic Execution', () => {
    it('executes commands within the workspace', async () => {
      const { command, args } = Platform.echo('sandbox test');
      const sandboxed = await manager.prepareCommand({
        command,
        args,
        cwd: workspace,
        env: process.env,
      });

      const result = await runCommand(sandboxed);
      assertResult(result, sandboxed, 'success');
      expect(result.stdout.trim()).toBe('sandbox test');
    });

    // The Windows sandbox wrapper (GeminiSandbox.exe) uses standard pipes
    // for I/O interception, which breaks ConPTY pseudo-terminal inheritance.
    it.skipIf(Platform.isWindows)(
      'supports interactive pseudo-terminals (node-pty)',
      async () => {
        const handle = await ShellExecutionService.execute(
          Platform.isPty(),
          workspace,
          () => {},
          new AbortController().signal,
          true,
          {
            sanitizationConfig: getSecureSanitizationConfig(),
            sandboxManager: manager,
          },
        );

        const result = await handle.result;
        expect(result.exitCode).toBe(0);
        expect(result.output).toContain('True');
      },
    );
  });

  describe('File System Access', () => {
    it('blocks access outside the workspace', async () => {
      const blockedPath = Platform.getExternalBlockedPath();
      const { command, args } = Platform.touch(blockedPath);

      const sandboxed = await manager.prepareCommand({
        command,
        args,
        cwd: workspace,
        env: process.env,
      });

      const result = await runCommand(sandboxed);
      assertResult(result, sandboxed, 'failure');
    });

    it('allows dynamic expansion of permissions after a failure', async () => {
      const tempDir = createTempDir('expansion-');
      const testFile = path.join(tempDir, 'test.txt');
      const { command, args } = Platform.touch(testFile);

      // First attempt: fails due to sandbox restrictions
      const sandboxed1 = await manager.prepareCommand({
        command,
        args,
        cwd: workspace,
        env: process.env,
      });
      const result1 = await runCommand(sandboxed1);
      assertResult(result1, sandboxed1, 'failure');
      expect(fs.existsSync(testFile)).toBe(false);

      // Second attempt: succeeds with additional permissions
      const sandboxed2 = await manager.prepareCommand({
        command,
        args,
        cwd: workspace,
        env: process.env,
        policy: { allowedPaths: [tempDir] },
      });
      const result2 = await runCommand(sandboxed2);
      assertResult(result2, sandboxed2, 'success');
      expect(fs.existsSync(testFile)).toBe(true);
    });

    it('grants access to explicitly allowed paths', async () => {
      const allowedDir = createTempDir('allowed-');
      const testFile = path.join(allowedDir, 'test.txt');

      const { command, args } = Platform.touch(testFile);
      const sandboxed = await manager.prepareCommand({
        command,
        args,
        cwd: workspace,
        env: process.env,
        policy: { allowedPaths: [allowedDir] },
      });

      const result = await runCommand(sandboxed);
      assertResult(result, sandboxed, 'success');
      expect(fs.existsSync(testFile)).toBe(true);
    });

    it('blocks write access to forbidden paths within the workspace', async () => {
      const tempWorkspace = createTempDir('workspace-');
      const forbiddenDir = path.join(tempWorkspace, 'forbidden');
      const testFile = path.join(forbiddenDir, 'test.txt');
      fs.mkdirSync(forbiddenDir);

      const osManager = createSandboxManager(
        { enabled: true },
        {
          workspace: tempWorkspace,
          forbiddenPaths: async () => [forbiddenDir],
        },
      );
      const { command, args } = Platform.touch(testFile);

      const sandboxed = await osManager.prepareCommand({
        command,
        args,
        cwd: tempWorkspace,
        env: process.env,
      });

      const result = await runCommand(sandboxed);
      assertResult(result, sandboxed, 'failure');
    });

    // Windows icacls does not reliably block read-up access for Low Integrity
    // processes, so we skip read-specific assertions on Windows. The internal
    // tool architecture prevents read bypasses via the C# wrapper and __read.
    it.skipIf(Platform.isWindows)(
      'blocks read access to forbidden paths within the workspace',
      async () => {
        const tempWorkspace = createTempDir('workspace-');
        const forbiddenDir = path.join(tempWorkspace, 'forbidden');
        const testFile = path.join(forbiddenDir, 'test.txt');
        fs.mkdirSync(forbiddenDir);
        fs.writeFileSync(testFile, 'secret data');

        const osManager = createSandboxManager(
          { enabled: true },
          {
            workspace: tempWorkspace,
            forbiddenPaths: async () => [forbiddenDir],
          },
        );

        const { command, args } = Platform.cat(testFile);

        const sandboxed = await osManager.prepareCommand({
          command,
          args,
          cwd: tempWorkspace,
          env: process.env,
        });

        const result = await runCommand(sandboxed);
        assertResult(result, sandboxed, 'failure');
      },
    );

    it('blocks access to files inside forbidden directories recursively', async () => {
      const tempWorkspace = createTempDir('workspace-');
      const forbiddenDir = path.join(tempWorkspace, 'forbidden');
      const nestedDir = path.join(forbiddenDir, 'nested');
      const nestedFile = path.join(nestedDir, 'test.txt');

      // Create the base forbidden directory first so the manager can restrict access to it.
      fs.mkdirSync(forbiddenDir);

      const osManager = createSandboxManager(
        { enabled: true },
        {
          workspace: tempWorkspace,
          forbiddenPaths: async () => [forbiddenDir],
        },
      );

      // Execute a dummy command so the manager initializes its restrictions.
      const dummyCommand = await osManager.prepareCommand({
        ...Platform.echo('init'),
        cwd: tempWorkspace,
        env: process.env,
      });
      await runCommand(dummyCommand);

      // Now create the nested items. They will inherit the sandbox restrictions from their parent.
      fs.mkdirSync(nestedDir, { recursive: true });
      fs.writeFileSync(nestedFile, 'secret');

      const { command, args } = Platform.touch(nestedFile);

      const sandboxed = await osManager.prepareCommand({
        command,
        args,
        cwd: tempWorkspace,
        env: process.env,
      });

      const result = await runCommand(sandboxed);
      assertResult(result, sandboxed, 'failure');
    });

    it('prioritizes forbiddenPaths over allowedPaths', async () => {
      const tempWorkspace = createTempDir('workspace-');
      const conflictDir = path.join(tempWorkspace, 'conflict');
      const testFile = path.join(conflictDir, 'test.txt');
      fs.mkdirSync(conflictDir);

      const osManager = createSandboxManager(
        { enabled: true },
        {
          workspace: tempWorkspace,
          forbiddenPaths: async () => [conflictDir],
        },
      );
      const { command, args } = Platform.touch(testFile);

      const sandboxed = await osManager.prepareCommand({
        command,
        args,
        cwd: tempWorkspace,
        env: process.env,
        policy: {
          allowedPaths: [conflictDir],
        },
      });

      const result = await runCommand(sandboxed);
      assertResult(result, sandboxed, 'failure');
    });

    it('gracefully ignores non-existent paths in allowedPaths and forbiddenPaths', async () => {
      const tempWorkspace = createTempDir('workspace-');
      const nonExistentPath = path.join(tempWorkspace, 'does-not-exist');

      const osManager = createSandboxManager(
        { enabled: true },
        {
          workspace: tempWorkspace,
          forbiddenPaths: async () => [nonExistentPath],
        },
      );
      const { command, args } = Platform.echo('survived');
      const sandboxed = await osManager.prepareCommand({
        command,
        args,
        cwd: tempWorkspace,
        env: process.env,
        policy: {
          allowedPaths: [nonExistentPath],
        },
      });

      const result = await runCommand(sandboxed);
      assertResult(result, sandboxed, 'success');
      expect(result.stdout.trim()).toBe('survived');
    });

    it('prevents creation of non-existent forbidden paths', async () => {
      const tempWorkspace = createTempDir('workspace-');
      const nonExistentFile = path.join(tempWorkspace, 'never-created.txt');

      const osManager = createSandboxManager(
        { enabled: true },
        {
          workspace: tempWorkspace,
          forbiddenPaths: async () => [nonExistentFile],
        },
      );

      // We use touch to attempt creation of the file
      const { command: cmdTouch, args: argsTouch } =
        Platform.touch(nonExistentFile);

      const sandboxedCmd = await osManager.prepareCommand({
        command: cmdTouch,
        args: argsTouch,
        cwd: tempWorkspace,
        env: process.env,
      });

      // Execute the command, we expect it to fail (permission denied or read-only file system)
      const result = await runCommand(sandboxedCmd);

      assertResult(result, sandboxedCmd, 'failure');
      expect(fs.existsSync(nonExistentFile)).toBe(false);
    });

    it('blocks access to both a symlink and its target when the symlink is forbidden', async () => {
      const tempWorkspace = createTempDir('workspace-');
      const targetFile = path.join(tempWorkspace, 'target.txt');
      const symlinkFile = path.join(tempWorkspace, 'link.txt');

      fs.writeFileSync(targetFile, 'secret data');
      fs.symlinkSync(targetFile, symlinkFile);

      const osManager = createSandboxManager(
        { enabled: true },
        {
          workspace: tempWorkspace,
          forbiddenPaths: async () => [symlinkFile],
        },
      );

      // Attempt to write to the target file directly
      const { command: cmdTarget, args: argsTarget } =
        Platform.touch(targetFile);
      const commandTarget = await osManager.prepareCommand({
        command: cmdTarget,
        args: argsTarget,
        cwd: tempWorkspace,
        env: process.env,
      });

      const resultTarget = await runCommand(commandTarget);
      assertResult(resultTarget, commandTarget, 'failure');

      // Attempt to write via the symlink
      const { command: cmdLink, args: argsLink } = Platform.touch(symlinkFile);
      const commandLink = await osManager.prepareCommand({
        command: cmdLink,
        args: argsLink,
        cwd: tempWorkspace,
        env: process.env,
      });

      const resultLink = await runCommand(commandLink);
      assertResult(resultLink, commandLink, 'failure');
    });
  });

  describe('Git Worktree Support', () => {
    it('allows access to git common directory in a worktree', async () => {
      const mainRepo = createTempDir('main-repo-');
      const worktreeDir = createTempDir('worktree-');

      const mainGitDir = path.join(mainRepo, '.git');
      fs.mkdirSync(mainGitDir, { recursive: true });
      fs.writeFileSync(
        path.join(mainGitDir, 'config'),
        '[core]\n\trepositoryformatversion = 0\n',
      );

      const worktreeGitDir = path.join(
        mainGitDir,
        'worktrees',
        'test-worktree',
      );
      fs.mkdirSync(worktreeGitDir, { recursive: true });

      // Create the .git file in the worktree directory pointing to the worktree git dir
      fs.writeFileSync(
        path.join(worktreeDir, '.git'),
        `gitdir: ${worktreeGitDir}\n`,
      );

      // Create the backlink from worktree git dir to the worktree's .git file
      const backlinkPath = path.join(worktreeGitDir, 'gitdir');
      fs.writeFileSync(backlinkPath, path.join(worktreeDir, '.git'));

      // Create a file in the worktree git dir that we want to access
      const secretFile = path.join(worktreeGitDir, 'secret.txt');
      fs.writeFileSync(secretFile, 'git-secret');

      const osManager = createSandboxManager(
        { enabled: true },
        { workspace: worktreeDir },
      );

      const { command, args } = Platform.cat(secretFile);
      const sandboxed = await osManager.prepareCommand({
        command,
        args,
        cwd: worktreeDir,
        env: process.env,
      });

      const result = await runCommand(sandboxed);
      assertResult(result, sandboxed, 'success');
      expect(result.stdout.trim()).toBe('git-secret');
    });

    it('blocks write access to git common directory in a worktree', async () => {
      const mainRepo = createTempDir('main-repo-');
      const worktreeDir = createTempDir('worktree-');

      const mainGitDir = path.join(mainRepo, '.git');
      fs.mkdirSync(mainGitDir, { recursive: true });

      const worktreeGitDir = path.join(
        mainGitDir,
        'worktrees',
        'test-worktree',
      );
      fs.mkdirSync(worktreeGitDir, { recursive: true });

      fs.writeFileSync(
        path.join(worktreeDir, '.git'),
        `gitdir: ${worktreeGitDir}\n`,
      );
      fs.writeFileSync(
        path.join(worktreeGitDir, 'gitdir'),
        path.join(worktreeDir, '.git'),
      );

      const targetFile = path.join(worktreeGitDir, 'secret.txt');

      const osManager = createSandboxManager(
        { enabled: true },
        // Use YOLO mode to ensure the workspace is fully writable, but git worktrees should still be read-only
        { workspace: worktreeDir, modeConfig: { yolo: true } },
      );

      const { command, args } = Platform.touch(targetFile);
      const sandboxed = await osManager.prepareCommand({
        command,
        args,
        cwd: worktreeDir,
        env: process.env,
      });

      const result = await runCommand(sandboxed);
      assertResult(result, sandboxed, 'failure');
      expect(fs.existsSync(targetFile)).toBe(false);
    });
  });

  describe('Network Access', () => {
    let server: http.Server;
    let url: string;

    beforeAll(async () => {
      server = http.createServer((_, res) => {
        res.setHeader('Connection', 'close');
        res.writeHead(200);
        res.end('ok');
      });
      await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
        server.on('error', reject);
        server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
          const addr = server.address() as import('net').AddressInfo;
          url = `http://127.0.0.1:${addr.port}`;
          resolve();
        });
      });
    });

    afterAll(async () => {
      if (server) await new Promise<void>((res) => server.close(() => res()));
    });

    // Windows Job Object rate limits exempt loopback (127.0.0.1) traffic,
    // so this test cannot verify loopback blocking on Windows.
    it.skipIf(Platform.isWindows)(
      'blocks network access by default',
      async () => {
        const { command, args } = Platform.curl(url);
        const sandboxed = await manager.prepareCommand({
          command,
          args,
          cwd: workspace,
          env: process.env,
        });

        const result = await runCommand(sandboxed);
        assertResult(result, sandboxed, 'failure');
      },
    );

    it('grants network access when explicitly allowed', async () => {
      const { command, args } = Platform.curl(url);
      const sandboxed = await manager.prepareCommand({
        command,
        args,
        cwd: workspace,
        env: process.env,
        policy: { networkAccess: true },
      });

      const result = await runCommand(sandboxed);
      assertResult(result, sandboxed, 'success');
      if (!Platform.isWindows) {
        expect(result.stdout.trim()).toBe('ok');
      }
    });
  });
});