Files
gemini-cli/packages/cli/src/config/policy-engine.integration.test.ts
2025-11-12 21:18:34 +00:00

500 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* @license
* Copyright 2025 Google LLC
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import {
ApprovalMode,
PolicyDecision,
PolicyEngine,
} from '@google/gemini-cli-core';
import { createPolicyEngineConfig } from './policy.js';
import type { Settings } from './settings.js';
describe('Policy Engine Integration Tests', () => {
describe('Policy configuration produces valid PolicyEngine config', () => {
it('should create a working PolicyEngine from basic settings', async () => {
const settings: Settings = {
tools: {
allowed: ['run_shell_command'],
exclude: ['write_file'],
},
};
const config = await createPolicyEngineConfig(
settings,
ApprovalMode.DEFAULT,
);
const engine = new PolicyEngine(config);
// Allowed tool should be allowed
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'run_shell_command' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
// Excluded tool should be denied
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'write_file' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
// Other write tools should ask user
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'replace' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
// Unknown tools should use default
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'unknown_tool' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
});
it('should handle MCP server wildcard patterns correctly', async () => {
const settings: Settings = {
mcp: {
allowed: ['allowed-server'],
excluded: ['blocked-server'],
},
mcpServers: {
'trusted-server': {
command: 'node',
args: ['server.js'],
trust: true,
},
},
};
const config = await createPolicyEngineConfig(
settings,
ApprovalMode.DEFAULT,
);
const engine = new PolicyEngine(config);
// Tools from allowed server should be allowed
// Tools from allowed server should be allowed
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'allowed-server__tool1' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
expect(
(
await engine.check(
{ name: 'allowed-server__another_tool' },
undefined,
)
).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
// Tools from trusted server should be allowed
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'trusted-server__tool1' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
expect(
(
await engine.check(
{ name: 'trusted-server__special_tool' },
undefined,
)
).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
// Tools from blocked server should be denied
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'blocked-server__tool1' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'blocked-server__any_tool' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
// Tools from unknown servers should use default
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'unknown-server__tool' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
});
it('should correctly prioritize specific tool excludes over MCP server wildcards', async () => {
const settings: Settings = {
mcp: {
allowed: ['my-server'],
},
tools: {
exclude: ['my-server__dangerous-tool'],
},
};
const config = await createPolicyEngineConfig(
settings,
ApprovalMode.DEFAULT,
);
const engine = new PolicyEngine(config);
// MCP server allowed (priority 2.1) provides general allow for server
// MCP server allowed (priority 2.1) provides general allow for server
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'my-server__safe-tool' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
// But specific tool exclude (priority 2.4) wins over server allow
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'my-server__dangerous-tool' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
});
it('should handle complex mixed configurations', async () => {
const settings: Settings = {
tools: {
autoAccept: true, // Allows read-only tools
allowed: ['custom-tool', 'my-server__special-tool'],
exclude: ['glob', 'dangerous-tool'],
},
mcp: {
allowed: ['allowed-server'],
excluded: ['blocked-server'],
},
mcpServers: {
'trusted-server': {
command: 'node',
args: ['server.js'],
trust: true,
},
},
};
const config = await createPolicyEngineConfig(
settings,
ApprovalMode.DEFAULT,
);
const engine = new PolicyEngine(config);
// Read-only tools should be allowed (autoAccept)
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'read_file' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'list_directory' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
// But glob is explicitly excluded, so it should be denied
expect((await engine.check({ name: 'glob' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(
PolicyDecision.DENY,
);
// Replace should ask user (normal write tool behavior)
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'replace' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
// Explicitly allowed tools
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'custom-tool' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'my-server__special-tool' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
// MCP server tools
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'allowed-server__tool' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'trusted-server__tool' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'blocked-server__tool' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
// Write tools should ask by default
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'write_file' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
});
it('should handle YOLO mode correctly', async () => {
const settings: Settings = {
tools: {
exclude: ['dangerous-tool'], // Even in YOLO, excludes should be respected
},
};
const config = await createPolicyEngineConfig(
settings,
ApprovalMode.YOLO,
);
const engine = new PolicyEngine(config);
// Most tools should be allowed in YOLO mode
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'run_shell_command' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'write_file' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'unknown_tool' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
// But explicitly excluded tools should still be denied
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'dangerous-tool' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
});
it('should handle AUTO_EDIT mode correctly', async () => {
const settings: Settings = {};
const config = await createPolicyEngineConfig(
settings,
ApprovalMode.AUTO_EDIT,
);
const engine = new PolicyEngine(config);
// Edit tools should be allowed in AUTO_EDIT mode
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'replace' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'write_file' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
// Other tools should follow normal rules
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'run_shell_command' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
});
it('should verify priority ordering works correctly in practice', async () => {
const settings: Settings = {
tools: {
autoAccept: true, // Priority 50
allowed: ['specific-tool'], // Priority 100
exclude: ['blocked-tool'], // Priority 200
},
mcp: {
allowed: ['mcp-server'], // Priority 85
excluded: ['blocked-server'], // Priority 195
},
mcpServers: {
'trusted-server': {
command: 'node',
args: ['server.js'],
trust: true, // Priority 90
},
},
};
const config = await createPolicyEngineConfig(
settings,
ApprovalMode.DEFAULT,
);
const engine = new PolicyEngine(config);
// Test that priorities are applied correctly
const rules = config.rules || [];
// Find rules and verify their priorities
const blockedToolRule = rules.find((r) => r.toolName === 'blocked-tool');
expect(blockedToolRule?.priority).toBe(2.4); // Command line exclude
const blockedServerRule = rules.find(
(r) => r.toolName === 'blocked-server__*',
);
expect(blockedServerRule?.priority).toBe(2.9); // MCP server exclude
const specificToolRule = rules.find(
(r) => r.toolName === 'specific-tool',
);
expect(specificToolRule?.priority).toBe(2.3); // Command line allow
const trustedServerRule = rules.find(
(r) => r.toolName === 'trusted-server__*',
);
expect(trustedServerRule?.priority).toBe(2.2); // MCP trusted server
const mcpServerRule = rules.find((r) => r.toolName === 'mcp-server__*');
expect(mcpServerRule?.priority).toBe(2.1); // MCP allowed server
const readOnlyToolRule = rules.find((r) => r.toolName === 'glob');
// Priority 50 in default tier → 1.05
expect(readOnlyToolRule?.priority).toBeCloseTo(1.05, 5);
// Verify the engine applies these priorities correctly
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'blocked-tool' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'blocked-server__any' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'specific-tool' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'trusted-server__any' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'mcp-server__any' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
expect((await engine.check({ name: 'glob' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(
PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
);
});
it('should handle edge case: MCP server with both trust and exclusion', async () => {
const settings: Settings = {
mcpServers: {
'conflicted-server': {
command: 'node',
args: ['server.js'],
trust: true, // Priority 90 - ALLOW
},
},
mcp: {
excluded: ['conflicted-server'], // Priority 195 - DENY
},
};
const config = await createPolicyEngineConfig(
settings,
ApprovalMode.DEFAULT,
);
const engine = new PolicyEngine(config);
// Exclusion (195) should win over trust (90)
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'conflicted-server__tool' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
});
it('should handle edge case: specific tool allowed but server excluded', async () => {
const settings: Settings = {
mcp: {
excluded: ['my-server'], // Priority 195 - DENY
},
tools: {
allowed: ['my-server__special-tool'], // Priority 100 - ALLOW
},
};
const config = await createPolicyEngineConfig(
settings,
ApprovalMode.DEFAULT,
);
const engine = new PolicyEngine(config);
// Server exclusion (195) wins over specific tool allow (100)
// This might be counterintuitive but follows the priority system
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'my-server__special-tool' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'my-server__other-tool' }, undefined))
.decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
});
it('should verify non-interactive mode transformation', async () => {
const settings: Settings = {};
const config = await createPolicyEngineConfig(
settings,
ApprovalMode.DEFAULT,
);
// Enable non-interactive mode
const engineConfig = { ...config, nonInteractive: true };
const engine = new PolicyEngine(engineConfig);
// ASK_USER should become DENY in non-interactive mode
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'unknown_tool' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'run_shell_command' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
});
it('should handle empty settings gracefully', async () => {
const settings: Settings = {};
const config = await createPolicyEngineConfig(
settings,
ApprovalMode.DEFAULT,
);
const engine = new PolicyEngine(config);
// Should have default rules for write tools
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'write_file' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'replace' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
// Unknown tools should use default
expect(
(await engine.check({ name: 'unknown' }, undefined)).decision,
).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
});
it('should verify rules are created with correct priorities', async () => {
const settings: Settings = {
tools: {
autoAccept: true,
allowed: ['tool1', 'tool2'],
exclude: ['tool3'],
},
mcp: {
allowed: ['server1'],
excluded: ['server2'],
},
};
const config = await createPolicyEngineConfig(
settings,
ApprovalMode.DEFAULT,
);
const rules = config.rules || [];
// Verify each rule has the expected priority
const tool3Rule = rules.find((r) => r.toolName === 'tool3');
expect(tool3Rule?.priority).toBe(2.4); // Excluded tools (user tier)
const server2Rule = rules.find((r) => r.toolName === 'server2__*');
expect(server2Rule?.priority).toBe(2.9); // Excluded servers (user tier)
const tool1Rule = rules.find((r) => r.toolName === 'tool1');
expect(tool1Rule?.priority).toBe(2.3); // Allowed tools (user tier)
const server1Rule = rules.find((r) => r.toolName === 'server1__*');
expect(server1Rule?.priority).toBe(2.1); // Allowed servers (user tier)
const globRule = rules.find((r) => r.toolName === 'glob');
// Priority 50 in default tier → 1.05
expect(globRule?.priority).toBeCloseTo(1.05, 5); // Auto-accept read-only
// The PolicyEngine will sort these by priority when it's created
const engine = new PolicyEngine(config);
const sortedRules = engine.getRules();
// Verify the engine sorted them correctly
for (let i = 1; i < sortedRules.length; i++) {
const prevPriority = sortedRules[i - 1].priority ?? 0;
const currPriority = sortedRules[i].priority ?? 0;
expect(prevPriority).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(currPriority);
}
});
});
});