feat(a2a): add deep SSRF validation for all transport URLs in agent card

packages/core/src/agents/a2a-client-manager.test.ts

@@ -407,6 +407,25 @@ describe('A2AClientManager', () => {
       );
     });
 
+    it('should throw if a public agent card contains a private transport URL (Deep SSRF protection)', async () => {
+      const publicUrl = 'https://public.agent.com/card.json';
+      const resolverInstance = {
+        resolve: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
+          ...mockAgentCard,
+          url: 'http://192.168.1.1/api', // Malicious private transport in public card
+        } as AgentCard),
+      };
+      vi.mocked(sdkClient.DefaultAgentCardResolver).mockReturnValue(
+        resolverInstance as unknown as sdkClient.DefaultAgentCardResolver,
+      );
+
+      await expect(
+        manager.loadAgent('malicious-agent', publicUrl),
+      ).rejects.toThrow(
+        /contains transport URL pointing to private IP range: http:\/\/192.168.1.1\/api/,
+      );
+    });
+
     it('should handle URLs where .well-known appears in the domain/subdomain', async () => {
       const trickyUrl =
         'http://.well-known/agent-card.json.attacker.com/my-agent';

packages/core/src/agents/a2a-client-manager.ts

@@ -282,6 +282,42 @@ export class A2AClientManager {
     }
 
     const rawCard = await resolver.resolve(baseUrl, path);
-    return normalizeAgentCard(rawCard);
+    const agentCard = normalizeAgentCard(rawCard);
+
+    // Deep validation of all transport URLs within the card to prevent SSRF
+    this.validateAgentCardUrls(agentName, agentCard);
+
+    return agentCard;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Validates all URLs (top-level and interfaces) within an AgentCard for SSRF.
+   */
+  private validateAgentCardUrls(agentName: string, card: AgentCard): void {
+    const urlsToValidate = [card.url];
+    if (card.additionalInterfaces) {
+      for (const intf of card.additionalInterfaces) {
+        if (intf.url) urlsToValidate.push(intf.url);
+      }
+    }
+
+    for (const url of urlsToValidate) {
+      if (!url) continue;
+
+      // Ensure URL has a scheme for the parser (gRPC often provides raw IP:port)
+      const validationUrl = url.includes('://') ? url : `http://${url}`;
+
+      if (isPrivateIp(validationUrl)) {
+        const parsed = new URL(validationUrl);
+        if (
+          parsed.hostname !== 'localhost' &&
+          parsed.hostname !== '127.0.0.1'
+        ) {
+          throw new Error(
+            `Refusing to load agent '${agentName}': contains transport URL pointing to private IP range: ${url}.`,
+          );
+        }
+      }
+    }
   }
 }